Malfunction and Malfeasance:
A Report on the Electronic Voting Machine Debacle
MALFUNCTION AND MALFEASANCE REPORT.PDF
Read about how not only does Johns Hopkins computer specialists testify
about our insecure voting machines -- but, also our very own Government
Accountability Office (GAO) states our voting machines are insecure.
Specifically that Diebold Machines should be pulled!
This report surveys four major studies that reviewed DRE voting machine security
and reliability. Two of the reports involved extensive review of more than 80
academic, technical, and industry reports on DREs. Each report concluded DRE
machines to be vulnerable to malfunction and also to tampering in which a
computer-savvy hacker with minimal access to the machine could introduce
malicious code to the DRE software and change the results of an election. Such
manipulation could be undetectable. In machines equipped with a modem, it could
even be done from a remote location.
Furthermore, there have been at least seven reported occasions since 2002 in
which electronic voting machines added or removed votes in real elections,
calling into question the final results of a race. For example, this spring, as
states across the country conducted primary elections, a programming error
caused a DRE in Tarrant County, Texas, to record an additional 100,000 votes
that were never actually cast. The election outcome is being challenged by a
candidate who lost by 6,000 votes.
Despite the security problems and serious malfunctions, in November DRE machines
will be used in 37 states, with 39 percent of voters expected to vote on them.
In many of these states, there are no adequate safeguards in place. State law
either does not require the voting system to produce a voter-verified paper
ballot or does not require a statistically meaningful and transparent audit
process. These states are at risk of compromised elections due to DRE
malfunction or tampering.
This report includes a chart detailing the status of each state, along with a
chart detailing the level of risk for voters in each state, and chart showing
which medium and high risk states allow no-excuse absentee voting.
To address these problems, Common Cause makes eight recommendations:
Congress should immediately pass HR 550, "The Voter Confidence
and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005."
States should pass laws or adopt regulations requiring all voting
systems to produce a voter verifiable paper ballot and mandate
that at least a random two percent of voting jurisdictions conduct
public audits of their voting systems.
Election officials should take necessary steps to safeguard machines
prior to Election Day.
State election officials should, wherever possible, immediately retrofit
DREs with printing systems to produce a voter verifiable paper
ballot, and use those ballots in audits.
In the instance where DREs cannot be retrofitted, Common Cause
recommends that state election officials decertify those DREs that
cannot provide a paper record and turn to other voting systems
such as optical scan machines for the November elections.
Congress and states should make emergency funds available for
purchase or lease of more secure, auditable machines.
Voters should be encouraged to vote on paper whenever possible.
If facing the prospect of voting on paperless DREs in November,
they should advocate for change with local election officials
well before the election. If that does not work, where possible,
voters should vote by absentee ballot.
Regardless of the voting equipment in a jurisdiction, citizens
should vote. While there is a chance that a vote won't be counted if
cast on a paperless DRE, not voting at all will assure that it is not.